An important issue in managerial accounting is the choice of performance metrics and the weight to put on them for incentive purposes. The appropriate choice of performance metrics and compensation weight are clearly dependent on (and an integral part of) the firm's organizational design. The purpose of this paper is to study the relation between compensation weight and a particular part of a manufacturing firm's organizational designthe choice of buffer size of inventory between two successive workstations. The choice of inventory buffer size plays a central role in modern manufacturing practices such as the Toyota Production System (TPS). Following popular manufacturing trends, manufacturers have been quick to slash such buffers in hopes of attaining greater productivity. By embedding a traditional operations model of inventory within a principal-agent model, we demonstrate that such decisions are not necessarily optimal from an incentive perspective.
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Incentive Compensation and The Choice of Inventory Buffer

I. Introduction
Agency research in managerial accounting has been primarily concerned with determining which signals are valuable as performance metrics and the optimal incentive compensation weight to place on each.
1 In the basic moral hazard problem, results are derived from an analysis of the behavior of the joint probability distribution of the firm's output (X) and performance metrics (Y) as a function of the agent's action, a. This probability distribution, ( )
, | f X Y a , represents the firm's environment and encapsulates the informational and production effects of the firm's organizational design decisions such as the choice of: transfer pricing policy (cost vs. market based), budgeting system, cost allocation policy; inventory replenishment policy (JIT vs. traditional); production system (push vs. pull production, assembly vs. team), etc. Thus, clearly, a central tenet of the principal-agent model is that optimal compensation is a function of the firm's other organizational design decisions.
2 While this insight is well-recognized in the literature, its implications are difficult to assess when ( ) , | f X Y a is specified in either too much generality or in unrealistic simplicity. 3 In order to assess these implications, one must model the organizational design decisions of interest in a realistic and recognizable manner. The purpose of this paper is to do so by specializing our inquiry to a manufacturing setting and to a particular organizational design decision, the choice of buffer size of inventory between two successive workstations.
We choose inventory buffer size as the organizational design decision of interest because it plays a central role in modern manufacturing practices such as the Toyota Production System (TPS). One objective of TPS is to minimize the amount of time units spend waiting for processing. This is typically achieved with small inventory buffers between workstations and a demand pull system in which upstream production of a part is not started until there is a demand for it downstream. The term kanban is used for production systems with these two characteristics. An inherent aspect of small inventory buffers is its tendency to block upstream production. With finite inventory buffer size, there is a positive probability that it will be full. When the buffer is full, it cannot accept any additional units (i.e., it is blocked), requiring the upstream workstation to cease production. By reducing the number of units entering the inventory, blockage reduces the number of units available to the downstream workstation and increases the probability that the inventory will be empty.
Thus, absent other considerations, limiting the buffer size increases the probability of blockage which increases the probability that the upstream workstation stops delivering product (while it waits for the blockage to be cleared) and the probability that the downstream station is idle (while it waits for its empty inventory to be filled). Blockage is therefore detrimental to the manufacturing process. Based on this logic, management accounting textbooks prescribe the use of large buffers (Horngren et al. [2006, p. 675] ). Yet, TPS and kanban are based on an extensive literature in operations management which suggests reasons for the use of small buffers; such as the early identification of errors. In this study, we demonstrate that the choice of inventory buffer size also has a heretofore unstudied incentive effect that must be considered in settings of moral hazard. In doing so, we show how the firm's choice of inventory buffer size affects the agent's marginal productivity, the informational content of throughput vis-à-vis an agent's efforts and consequently the compensation weight placed on throughput.
We begin by considering a single-period model where an agent operates a single downstream workstation. At the start of the period, the downstream agent expends effort to set his workstation's stochastic processing rate. In order to produce output, the downstream workstation must be supplied with an intermediate product produced by an upstream workstation. The upstream workstation produces the intermediate product at an exogenous but stochastic rate. 4 The principal selects the size of the inventory buffer into which the intermediate product is delivered and from which the downstream agent withdraws units on which to begin processing. 5 If the inventory is not full, the arriving intermediate product is The operations management literature has extensively studied this problem and discussed the various factors that the principal needs to consider in setting the inventory buffer when the downstream workstation is not subject to agency problems. We show that the optimal choice of inventory buffer size changes with the introduction of a self-interested agent, as the principal must now consider the incentive effects of her choice of buffer size.
To conduct our analysis, we embed a standard M/M/1/b queuing model within a principal-agent model in which the principal wants the agent to incur a specific (obedient) level of effort and compensates the agent on the basis of throughput. 6 We find that inventory 4 In Section VI, we model the upstream workstation as being run by an agent who is subject to moral hazard. 5 Until Section VI, whenever we refer to the "agent" or the "workstation" we will mean the downstream agent and workstation which are producing the final output, rather than the upstream process generating the intermediate product. 6 In an M/M/1/b queuing model, the stochastic inter-arrival time of the intermediate unit is exponentially distributed/the processing rate of the workstation is exponentially distributed/there is 1 workstation/the intermediate product inventory buffer has a maximum capacity of b units, including the unit being worked on. These are standard assumptions when modeling production environments (see Hopp and Spearman [2001] ).
buffer size and agent effort can be either strategic complements or substitutes. Therefore, increasing the inventory buffer size can either decrease or increase the incentives needed to motivate the agent. They are complements (substitutes) the smaller (larger) the inventory buffer and the smaller (larger) the obedient effort. We find that the optimal buffer is decreasing in the agent's obedient effort level, implying that from an incentive perspective, kanban practices such as small inventory buffer sizes are only optimal when the agent is asked to deliver relatively high levels of effort.
Finally, we extend the analysis to a multi-workstation setting in which both the upstream and downstream workstations are run by different agents, each of whom is subject to moral hazard. We allow the upstream agent to select his output rate and to choose whether to help the downstream agent process the intermediate products.
In this setting, all of our key results continue to hold. In addition, we show that helping effort from the upstream agent can act as a strategic complement or a strategic substitute for the downstream agent's effort depending, again, on the inventory buffer size and the obedient effort level.
Thus, the main contribution of this paper is to embed the analysis of the interrelation between a firm's incentive compensation decision and another organizational design decision (the choice of inventory buffer) in a realistic manufacturing model. We then identify and derive a new incentive effect of the principal's choice of the inventory buffer and show how that choice affects the principal's choice of the agent's incentive compensation weight. In doing so, we add to the literature that highlights how organizational design decisions need to be considered in designing agents' incentive compensation. We also offer an incentivesbased explanation for the relation between inventory buffer size and worker motivation found in the empirical literature.
II. Literature Review
A relatively recent innovation in the practice of operations management is the Toyota Production System (TPS). One aspect of TPS is kanban production which is essentially a serial production system with small buffers and blocking. Included among kanban's documented costs is lower throughput because of blocking. 7 Included among its documented benefits are earlier detection of errors, reduction of inventory, warehouse and floor space usage (and therefore holding cost), reduction in lead times, and quicker reaction to changes in demand patterns. Although none of the analytical operations management literature has shown how a production system with limited inventory might affect worker incentives, some of the empirical operations management literature has noted such possible incentive effects.
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The empirical evidence most germane to our model is provided by Doerr et al. [1996] , Schultz et al. [1998] and Schultz et al. [1999] . Doerr et al. [1996] finds that workers in a JIT system spend more time idle but work faster when inventory is available. Schultz et al. [1998] show that processing time distributions in production lines depend on the size of inventory buffers. Low inventory buffers are shown to motivate workers and the benefit of this enhanced motivation can exceed the productivity losses due to blocking. Similarly, Schultz et al. [1999] demonstrate that slow workers tend to work faster when faced with lower inventory buffers. In sum, these papers find that there exists an empirical association between reduced inventory size and increased worker motivation, albeit they fail to provide a formal economic explanation for their findings.
Our interest is in using the principal-agent model to study the incentive effect of inventory buffer size. Other papers which study the incentive effects of different organizational design decisions include those which have analyzed: job design (Holmstrom 7 Throughout we use "output" and "throughput" interchangeably. 8 See Groenevelt [1993] and Berkley [1992] for surveys of the analytical literature and more discussion of kanban. See, MacDuffie [1995] for an example of the empirical literature.
and Milgrom [1991] , Balakrishnan et al. [1998] and Riordan and Sappington [1987] ); the choice of production systems and technologies (Hemmer [1998] and Hemmer [1995b] )); the hierarchical structuring of work (Melumad et al. [1995] ); different routing schemes for product rework (Lu et al. [2006] ); and production bottlenecks (Datar and Rajan [1995] and Gietzmann and Hemmer [2002] ). 9 However, none of these papers consider the incentive effects of the choice of inventory buffer sizes.
Closest to our work is Alles et al. [1995] . 10 Like the present paper, Alles et al. show that the optimal inventory size is affected by incentive problems. However, Alles et al. Relating to our final section, a number of prior papers have studied ways in which to encourage helping effort among workers (e.g., Itoh [1991] , Hemmer [1995b] , and Siemsen et al. [Forthcoming] ). However, unlike ours, the prior studies do not consider the role of inventory buffer size in fostering help between the agents.
III. The Single-Agent Model
The firm consists of a risk-neutral principal and an agent who, at the start of the 9 Also somewhat related to the present work is Cremer [1995] which examines the incentive effects on both the buyer and supplier when the buyer goes to a zero-inventory system for the supplier's product. However, the two motivations are different in that Cremer's is based on a double moral hazard model. 10 See also the discussion of Alles et al. [1995] in Hemmer [1995a] . 11 This is motivated by the assertion that reducing inventory "stresses" the production process, making it "more transparent".
period, agree to a contract which will govern their employment relation. In Section VI we relax this assumption and allow the upstream workstation to be run by an agent who is subject to moral hazard. 13 An alternative scenario is one in which orders arrive stochastically at the work station. If the agent is currently working on a job, the newly arrived order goes into the order queue. If the order queue is already full, the order disappears forever. 14 In a one-card system, the upstream workstation delivers units to the inventory as long as it is not full. 15 Throughout the paper we use the manufacturing context as an application of our model but it applies equally to other settings such as call centers with a limited number of incoming lines or transmission equipment with a limited number of trunks. In this latter case "effort" is interpreted as a capacity investment by, for example, the call center manager. 16 The other effort, which consists of taking the intermediate product from the inventory and putting it into the workstation is sufficiently simple and observable that we assume that it is not subject to moral hazard. Alternatively, one can assume that it is subject to moral hazard but that the agent's choice of his workstations referring to this latter effort.
For reasons of tractability, we limit compensation from the principal to the agent to a fixed payment plus a piece-rate wage based on throughput and the size of the incoming buffer inventory. 17 18 We adopt the following notation: Berg and Fast [1975] and Hall et al. [2000] . 18 Another potentially observable signal on which the principal could compensate the agent is the realized inventory level. However, the only way to obtain an accurate count of the inventory is to periodically stop the production line and conduct manual count. We assume that the opportunity cost of doing so is sufficiently large that the principal chooses not to collect this information. 19 Exponential assumptions with respect to the arrival process and service times are widely used in modeling different production systems. See any textbook on queuing systems for detailed discussion and critique. 20 See Hopp and Spearman [2001, pp. 273 -274] .
decisions using highly simplified models of production settings. 21 By employing a realistic model of a multi-workstation manufacturing plant, we provide a clearer incentive-based explanation for the empirical observations to date.
Given that the agent expends his effort at the start of the period to set the workstation's mean processing rate, his effort is personally costly regardless of whether he has intermediate products to work on or not. In particular, after having selected his effort at the start of the period, throughput is purely a function of the workstation's realized processing rate and the inter-arrival rate of the intermediate product. In order to keep the problem tractable, we focus on the problem's steady state. 22 That is, we assume that the principal is interested in minimizing her steady state expected cost of inducing the agent to choose the obedient effort in setting up the workstation, r . 23 In turn, we assume that the agent selects his effort to maximize his steady state expected utility, although subject to a limited liability constraint. In particular, the agent acts as if he is risk-neutral as long as the contract assures him at least 0 utility in every state of the world; i.e., for any throughput realization. The agent also has an ex-ante minimum expected utility constraint, which for convenience, we assume to be zero. Therefore, we can ignore it.
The steady state mean throughput of the work station, which we label K, can be 21 For example, most use the LEN model in which the production function is assumed to be linear in the agent's action choice. For exceptions see Balachandran and Radhakrishan [1996] , Radhakrishan and Balachandran [1995] and Radhakrishan and Balachandran [2004] who use queuing models similar to ours to analyze the role of cost allocation in resolving congestion problems. 22 The process reaches steady state when the probability distributions over the inventory levels and the throughput are no longer functions of the starting conditions and no longer vary over time. That is, while the realized inventory level and throughput at any moment are still uncertain, the probability distributions which describe them do not vary over time. The behavior of queuing systems before they reach steady state is very difficult to analyze. For an example, see Plambeck and Zenios [2003] . 23 As demonstrated by Grossman and Hart [1983] , analyzing any hidden action problem can be divided into two steps: finding the optimal contract that will induce a particular obedient effort; finding the obedient effort that maximizes the principal's expected utility. We concentrate on the first step here , in order to most clearly isolate the incentive effect of inventory buffer size in which we are interested. See Section V for a more general discussion. The principal's objective is to minimize the steady state expected compensation needed to induce the agent to choose the obedient effort, r. Constraint (LL) states that, in order to accept employment, the agent must be assured of attaining a non-negative utility for any 24 See Hopp and Spearman [2001] for a detailed derivation of mean throughput. 25 We are ignoring the holding cost of inventory. Including it would not qualitatively affect our results. We discuss the role of inventory holding and storage costs in Section V.
realized throughput K . Given that the minimum realized throughput possible is 0 K = , constraint (LL) implies that 0 w ar ≥ . Finally, constraint (IC) insures that the agent will select the obedient level of effort r when maximizing his steady state utility.
In the next section we begin our analysis of the effect of the inventory buffer size, b, on the compensation weight that is required to induce the agent to choose the obedient effort, r. Given our manufacturing setting, it is natural for b to take on only integer values.
Therefore we will analyze the behavior of ( 1 ) (
IV. Results
For notational simplicity we will frequently refer to the agent's decision variable as Lemma 1: The agent's problem is concave in r and, hence, in ρ . Further, the optimal piecerate is:
which is non-negative and increasing in r and, hence, in ρ .
The lemma demonstrates that the optimal compensation weight is simply the agent's marginal cost of effort, a, divided by his expected marginal productivity. The issue then is, how does the optimal compensation weight ( ) w b, ρ behave in b and ρ ; i.e., how does the agent's marginal productivity behave over b and ρ .
A natural point at which to begin the analysis is to examine the behavior of the optimal piece-rate, ( ) w b, ρ , at b=1. When b=1, the buffer is zero and the only unit "in inventory" is the unit being processed by the agent at the workstation. Because we restrict inventory to be of integer units, the relevant measure of agency cost at b=1 is (2 ) (1 ) w w ρ ρ , − , . We can explicitly solve for the difference:
Therefore, for sufficiently small obedient effort ρ ; i.e.,
ρ <
, increasing the buffer from one to two units results in a decrease in the required compensation weight. On the other hand, for sufficiently large obedient effort; i.e., 1.769
, increasing the b from one to two results in an increase in the required compensation weight. 26 Hence at b=1, for small obedient effort, the inventory buffer and the compensation weight are substitutes while for large obedient effort they are complements. Put another way, for small obedient effort, increasing the inventory buffer from one to two units mitigates the agency problem, while for large obedient effort, increasing the inventory buffer from one to two units exacerbates the agency problem. Recall that Alles et al. [1995] found that increasing the inventory buffer always mitigated the agency problem. Therefore, the source of our incentive effect must be different from their assumed source. Before discussing our source, we show that this mitigating/exacerbating effect holds in general. inventory buffer size has a non-monotonic effect on the agent's incentive problem. In particular, Proposition 1 establishes that the presence of incentive concerns lead to the somewhat counter-intuitive result that, even without inventory holding and storage costs, the optimal inventory buffer size can be finite.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1, recall that the probability of blockage and the agent's marginal productivity are affected by both b and ρ . Further, the agent chooses his effort so as to equate his compensation weight times his marginal productivity with his marginal disutility of effort, a. For a given buffer size, with ρ small (i.e., (1 1 ) ρ ∈ , + Δ ): the intermediate units are arriving at the inventory slightly slower than they are being removed by the agent to be processed; hence the probability that blockage will occur is significant and the expected number of intermediate units that will be allowed to enter the inventory--and that the agent will have on which to work and for which he has expended his set-up effort--relative to the unobstructed arrival rate, λ , is small. Therefore, increasing the buffer allows the agent to work on more units and increases the agent's marginal productivity, making it less expensive to induce the obedient effort. Note, however, that a slight increase in the size of the buffer will not make the threat of blockage disappear. Therefore any increase in the agent's effort will not only process a greater expected quantity of units, but will also contribute to a reduced probability of blockage.
On the other hand, with the same buffer but ρ large (i.e.,
ρ ∈ + Δ,∞ ), the probability of blockage is small and thus most of the intermediate units are already able to enter the inventory and be processed by the agent's effort. Increasing ρ will increase expected throughput by only a small amount. In the large ρ case, the intermediate inventory's arrival rate is much more of a constraint on expected throughput than is the agent's processing rate. Because ρ is large, the probability of blockage is low and the marginal productivity of ρ is low. Hence, reducing the buffer increases probability of blockage thereby increases the agent's expected marginal productivity and reduces the wage required to induce the obedient effort. This point is perhaps best illustrated at the extremes. Therefore there must exist a ρ beyond which marginal productivity (the incentive compensation weight) is decreasing (increasing) in b.
Another way to interpret Proposition 1 is in terms of the informativeness of K with respect to the agent's effort. Fix the buffer size. When ρ is small, for the reasons given above, increasing the buffer makes the K realization more sensitive to (and informative about) the agent's effort choice. This allows the principal to better infer the agent's effort from K and therefore induce the obedient effort with less incentive compensation weight.
Likewise, hold fixed buffer size. For the reasons given above, beyond some ρ , decreasing the buffer makes the K realization more sensitive to (and informative about) the agent's effort Whether the piece-rate and the inventory buffer size are strategic substitutes or complements therefore depends on the effort which the principal wants to induce the agent to take. This finding is consistent with practices that are currently observed in the automotive industry, for example; Japanese manufacturers generally have both higher productivity (i.e., higher obedient effort) and lower inventory buffers than their American counterparts.
However, in recent years American automotive manufacturers have been steadily implementing principles from Toyota Production System thus decreasing inventory buffers and simultaneously achieving higher productivity. 27 In a somewhat related finding, Hemmer [1998] demonstrates that changes in job design can affect the informativeness of output. 28 Notice that our interpretation of informativeness and its relation to the agent's incentive compensation weight are different from the signal to noise ratio interpretation and relation in Banker and Datar [1989] and the literature that uses the LEN model. The reasons for these differences are two-fold. First, our agent is riskneutral and, thus, the effect of noise on risk is irrelevant. Second, in our paper the principal's desired obedient effort for the agent does not vary with the informativeness of output. In the other papers it does. Thus, in the other papers, the effect of changes in informativeness on the agent's incentive compensation weight is mediated by changes in the agent's induced effort.
Further, as long as 1 ρ > , then Proposition 1 establishes that for any buffer size, the optimal incentive compensation weight is minimized at a single level of effort. However, in our formulation, the principal is interested in the optimal buffer size given a fixed obedient level of effort r. The following proposition characterizes the relation between the optimal inventory buffer size and the agent's obedient effort.
Proposition 2: For any given 1 ρ > , the incentive compensation weight minimizing inventory buffer size is decreasing in the obedient processing rate.
Proposition 2 establishes that the optimal buffer size is decreasing in the obedient level of effort as long as the agent's obedient level of effort, ρ , exceeds the inventory interarrival rate ( 1 ρ > ). 29 To understand this result, suppose that for a given effort, ρ , the optimal (inventory size, wage) pair is ( ) Thus, the more effort the principal desires from the agent, the smaller the optimal buffer size. However, because we must have 1 b ≥ , a limit argument suggests that for sufficiently large obedient efforts, a zero-inventory (b=1) buffer is in fact optimal. The following proposition allows us to derive a sufficient condition for this to be the case. . That is, when the agent's obedient processing rate equals the inter-arrival rate of inventory, an infinitely large buffer is optimal.
Continuing our examination of relatively small obedient levels of effort, we now turn to the case of 1 < ρ . We have the following Corollary, which follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1:
Corollary 1: The optimal incentive compensation weight is decreasing in b, for 1.
Thus, regardless of initial buffer size, when 1, ρ < the incentive compensation weight is minimized when the buffer is maximized. To see the logic underlying the corollary, note that when 1 ρ < , the intermediate good is arriving, on average, faster than the agent can process it. This means that as time goes on, in expectation the inventory will tend to fill up.
Hence, when 1 ρ < , the steady state probability of the buffer being full is large, regardless of the size of the buffer. As a result when 1 ρ < , if the principal increases the size of the buffer by one, the probability is large that the additional spot in the buffer will be filled and the agent will have an additional unit on which to work. Thus, the agent's expected marginal productivity will increase in response to a larger buffer, allowing the principal to pay the agent a smaller w while still inducing the obedient effort. In practice the situation with 1 ρ > is much more natural since the production system is rarely, if ever, designed in such a way that the processing rate is lower than the arrival rate of the intermediate product (bottleneck).
More likely the situation with 1 ρ < might become relevant in relatively short time intervals when demand exceeds the nominal level. Table 1 below provides four examples which illustrate our results. In the examples, the agent's coefficient of disutility (a) is set at one and λ is also set at one. The principal is interested in minimizing the incentive compensation wage required to induce the agent to take a fixed effort, r. As per the previous propositions and corollaries, the principal selects the largest possible buffer if r λ ≤ . However, if r λ > , then the principal prefers a finite buffer, with the optimal buffer size shrinking in the desired level of effort. The optimal buffer in each case is indicated by an asterisk. Models which analyze optimal inventory levels typically include out-of-pocket costs such as storage and holding. We have demonstrated the somewhat counter-intuitive result that even without out-of-pocket costs of holding and storing inventory, when the principal wants to induce a fixed obedient effort from the agent, the optimal inventory buffer size can be finite. It is important to emphasize, however, that this result is not independent of these out-pocket inventory costs. As Corollary 1 noted, a necessary condition for this result is that the desired level of effort by the agent be such that 1 ρ > . But the optimal ρ will be greater than one only in the presence of out-of-pocket inventory costs or physical constraints on the maximum size of the inventory. That is, in the absence of out-of-pocket inventory costs or physical constraints on the size of the inventory buffer, inventory space is a free good which increases the workstation's throughput and can substitute for the agent's costly effort.
Without inventory storage and holding costs or physical limits on the maximum size of the inventory, the principal is always better off by substituting the free storage space for costly effort by the agent, driving inventory to infinity and 1 ρ < . In this case our result does not arise and the optimal inventory buffer is, indeed, infinite. Thus, our analysis is based on the implicit assumption of out-of-pocket inventory costs or physical limitations on the maximum size of the inventory buffer. However, incorporating explicit inventory costs into our model would merely reduce the optimal buffer size, but would not affect our qualitative results.
To this point we have assumed that the principal was interested in minimizing the cost of inducing a fixed level of effort from the agent. As explained above, we did so in order to most clearly isolate the incentive effect of the inventory buffer. More generally, the principal may be interested in minimizing the steady state expected cost of inducing a fixed steady state throughput or in maximizing her steady-state expected net profit. In those cases, the trade-off facing the principal is between inventory buffer size and the agent's induced level of effort. In this section we generalize our previous analysis by assuming that the principal wishes to minimize the expected cost of inducing a fixed steady-state mean throughput, as opposed to minimizing the cost of a specific level of effort. We begin by examining the benchmark setting in which there is no agency problem. To prevent a trivial solution we assume a storage cost of c per unit of inventory buffer. The principal's cost in this setting is thus, ar cb + . Because of the discreteness and complexity of the problem, we are unable to derive a closed form for the optimal effort and buffer size for a given desired steady state throughput. Instead, we illustrate the problem with a series of numerical examples. Table 2 provides several examples all assuming: the inter-arrival rate of inventory of 1 λ = , the cost per unit of inventory buffer c=1, and an agent disutility coefficient of a=1.
Since 1 λ = , only mean steady-state throughputs of 1 K ≤ are feasible. The first column contains the principal's assumed target mean steady-state throughput K, whereas the second and third columns contain buffer-effort pairings that attain the target throughput. The fourth column is the principal's steady state out-of-pocket costs when the agent's effort is observable; i.e., without any incentive problems. The optimal (least costly) buffer-effort pairing for each target level of throughput is starred. Similarly, the final column is the principal's steady state expected cost when the agent's actions are unobservable; i.e., the principal's cost is given by: ( ) , w b r K ar cb + + . In the fifth column the optimal buffer-effort pairing for each target mean throughput level for the second-best case is double starred. The difference in the optimal pairings across the fourth and fifth columns reflects the agency costs borne by the principal when the agent's efforts are non-observable. Table 2 illustrates that the principal optimally chooses a buffer in the moral hazard setting which is at least as large as and induces an effort level from the agent which is no greater than that in the first-best setting. To understand the intuition underlying Table 2 , note that when the obedient processing effort, r, is not fixed but K is fixed, then in the first-best setting, reducing r implies increasing b. In the second-best setting, reducing r also implies increasing b. However, Propositions 3 and 4 imply that by reducing r (equivalently ρ ) the principal may be moving into the region in which w is decreasing in b which, in turn, optimally implies a further increase in b and an associated further reduction in r as in Proposition 2. Figure 2 plots the data from Table 2 . The isoquant points for steady-state mean throughput levels of 0.9, 0.6 and 0.3 are joined by line segments. The downward sloping straight lines are the corresponding benchmark isocost lines assuming the agent's cost of effort (a=1) and the cost of providing inventory buffers (c=1). As per standard microeconomic theory, the optimal effort-buffer pairs in the benchmark setting are the points at which the isocost and isoquant curves are tangent. However, as per Table 2 , the optimal effort-buffer pairs in the setting where the agent's effort is unobservable do not necessarily correspond to the optimal pairs in the benchmark setting. We have placed large black dots on the optimal effort-buffer pairs in the second-best setting on each corresponding isoquant.
Note that for K=0.3, the optimal pairs for the benchmark-and second-best settings are identical because the desired mean throughput is sufficiently small that the corresponding level of effort needed to attain the target throughput is itself small. Proposition 1 demonstrated that the associated incentive effect of inventory in this setting is also small, so small in fact, that it is insufficient to change the principal's choice of effort-buffer bundle from the first-best setting. To this point we have assumed that the upstream workstation operated according to an exogenously specified stochastic process. We analyzed the incentive effects of the inventory buffer size on the downstream agent's incentives. However, a more realistic assumption is that the upstream workstation is also operated by an agent who is subject to moral hazard. In this setting, the choice of the inventory buffer size will affect the upstream agent's incentives and may have a qualitatively different effect on the downstream agent's incentives from what we found above. Further, recent manufacturing (and management) trends involve a more pronounced role for cross-functional employees in which workers are assigned individual roles but are frequently asked to provide helping effort to their co-workers (Nissan Annual Report 2005). For both of these reasons, in this section we allow both the downstream and the upstream station to be manned by self-interested agents and allow the upstream agent to provide helping effort to the downstream agent.
As before, the intermediate product is produced by the upstream workstation at a rate which is exponentially distributed with a mean of λ . However now, that mean is chosen by the upstream agent, the choice is known only by the upstream agent and is subject to moral 
and similarly, the downstream agent's steady state expected utility is: is the optimal piece-rate wage from the one-agent case studied earlier. 31 The proof of Proposition 5 follows directly from the first-order condition for the optimal . At low levels of ρ , increasing h, increases the downstream agent's marginal productivity, making it less expensive to motivate the obedient effort from him. However, at high levels of ρ , increasing h, decreases the downstream agent's marginal productivity, increases his incentive to shirk, and makes it more expensive to motivate the obedient effort from him. An alternative way of viewing this result is that at low levels of ρ , h and r are strategic complements while at high levels of ρ , h and r are strategic substitutes. That is, supplying more helping effort to the downstream agent can either cause him to work harder or shirk. The intuition behind this result is similar to the role of inventory buffers on reproduced here. afford to slightly shirk without altering his output since output can never exceed the arrival rate of intermediary products. For ρ greater than ρ , the latter effect dominates, whereas for ρ less than ρ , the former effect dominates.
Turning to the upstream agent, the principal has two instruments ( uth w and δ ) with which to motivate two types of effort (production of inputs and helping effort) from the upstream agent. The following proposition establishes the similarity between the penalties assessed against the agents for coordination failures, and characterizes the behavior of uth w in b.
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Proposition 6: The optimal penalty δ can be rewritten as We plot all piece-rates given the parameters: L=H=a=r=h=1 and λ =3.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper we studied a simple manufacturing setting and demonstrated the incentive implications of the choice of the inventory buffer size. We showed that the choice of the intervening inventory buffer has a non-trivial effect on the incentive compensation weights required to induce fixed obedient efforts from agents operating in serial. One interpretation of our results related the size of the inventory buffer to the informativeness of output. When the downstream agent obedient effort was relatively small, the principal preferred larger buffers. However for larger levels of obedient effort, smaller buffers were deemed optimal. The results offer an explanation for the previously documented finding in the empirical operations management literature of a negative association between the inventory buffer size and worker motivation.
Our analysis was based on a number of modeling assumptions. First, we assumed a linear disutility for the agents' efforts. Although this made the model tractable, the basic intuition underlying our results would continue to hold with a more general specification of the agent's disutility of effort. Second, we assumed that the principal was interested in inducing an obedient level of effort, as opposed to inducing a specific steady state expected throughput, or more generally, maximizing expected profit. As discussed in the Section V, regardless of the principal's objective function, as long as the obedient processing rate is greater than the inter-arrival rate of the intermediate product, the inventory buffer will have the incentive effect analyzed. The desired obedient processing effort will exceed the interarrival rate for the intermediate product as long as there is a large enough inventory carrying or storage charge or there is a constraint on the maximum size of the inventory buffer.
Finally, we assumed that the principal compensated the agent with a fixed wage and piecerate. Although such a compensation scheme is characteristic of many assembly line contracts, the paper can be extended by considering non-linear payment schemes. However, because our results are based on the effect of altering inventory buffers on the marginal productivity of an agent facing a blocked queue, we believe our results are robust to such
generalizations.
There are a number of ways in which this research can be extended. First, although
we have characterized the optimal sized buffer as a function of a principal's desired level of effort, we have not found a closed form expression for the optimal buffer size. The difficulty in doing so is that buffer size is a discrete choice variable. Second, we couched our analysis within the context of a standard M/M/1/b model, which assumes that both interarrival and processing times follow exponential distributions. Future research could relax these assumptions by considering generally distributed interarrival and processing times. Third, the present model assumed that both the principal and agent were perfectly informed as to the agent's processing abilities. It would be interesting to examine the effect of adverse selection on the optimal buffer size; in particular, how does the buffer size vary as the principal becomes better informed as to the agent's type. 
Substituting the functional form of K gives:
The denominator is non-positive if and only if r ≥ λ . Further, b r r r r r which shows that all three roots are at r = λ . Finally, since the third derivative is positive, the Extremum Test assures that N has a saddle point at r = λ . 33 Lastly, note that if r=0, then N is negative for any valid combinations of b and λ , thus we are assured that N crosses zero from below for all valid parameters b and λ . Thus, the numerator is non-negative for r ≥ λ .
As such, the constraint (IC) to be expressed as:
which implies:
from which it follows that the optimal w is positive and increasing in r.
Proof of Proposition 1:
One can show that, in general, ( 1 ) (
First, we claim that the denominator in (2) is non-negative. To show this, consider 
Note, that (3) has two sign changes, and by Descartes' rule, the number of roots in (0 ) , ∞ is at most two. To see that the root at 1 has multiplicity two, we again use Lemma 0. Note that Given that the leading coefficient is non-positive expression, the only term that can potentially alternate in sign is the numerator of (2): 
First note that (5) has a root at 1 = ρ . We claim that the root at 1 = ρ has multiplicity three.
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( 1) 6 ( 1 2 ) (6 10 3 ) 5 ( 2 6 9 5 6 12 
Now, at 1 = ρ both (6) and (7) 
Note that the exponents of ρ never cross, i.e., the exponents can be ordered: Next we continue with the proof of Proposition 3. To do so, we wish to derive a more convenient representation of ( ) w b p , . To this end, we have: ( 1) ( 1) 
( 1) ( 1)( ) 
We can use Lemma 3 with 1 ρ > on the right-hand side of (10) to conclude that it is less than or equal to 
The inequality (11) will hold whenever ρ is larger than the greatest root of the polynomial on the left-hand side of (11). The two roots are given by 
Proof of Proposition 6:
Given the two first-order conditions, the unique set of incentives ( ) 
(1 ) The numerator of (12) has only a single term that can vary in sign, (1 ) ( 2) 0
(1 ) ( 2) 0 1 (1 ) ( 2) (1 )(2 ) 0. 
